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Abstract. With this project, we focus on Russian information-based global in-
fluences or “hacks” in order to generate new ideas about disruptive digital ac-
tivities that can emanate from any country and bring effects that are potentially 
global in their impact. Russia as both a site and political actor exemplifies a 
case of global, digital, and democratic disruption, and this research points to po-
tential locations housing Russian information troops. The findings provide a 
way to see patterns in media-related tactics contributing overall to the existing 
evidence of ‘hybrid’ or information warfare identified in recent literature. 
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1 Introduction 
Hacked data and disinformation are all powerful tools used alongside cyber sabotage 
and military force in different parts of the Western world. In recent years, Russia has 
taken central stage in the scholarly analyses of new media use and information strate-
gies utilized for the purposes of political influence (e.g., Pasitselska, 2017). This re-
search presented here is drawn from the authors’ broader agenda exploring Russia’s 
information war tactics more generally. To examine Russia’s information hacks and 
related strategies, we focus on digital trends and Internet use. In doing so, we can 
illuminate the Russia case while also contributing to conversations about how schol-
ars can explore digital activity to uncover political influence around the world.  
 
2 Method 
 
This inductive study follows an interpretive case study design (Walsham, 1995; Yin, 
2002), and focuses on Russia as a case of a nation engaging information warfare tac-
tics. This project aligns with methodological guidelines on the ways case study work 
can be used “to explore in depth a particular phenomenon in a contemporary context” 
Farquhar, 2012, p.9). The authors focused on "developing an in-depth description and 
analysis of a case ... " (Creswell, 2007, p. 78). Data for this project are comprised of 
publicly available documents and data pulled from Google Trends. Analytically, we 
considered the data iteratively, looking for patterns, locations, and activity in Russia. 
We also looked interpretively at the content of online posts and published work com-
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ing out of Russia to draw patterns and to find connections across them. From this case 
we can learn processes by which one nation can influence many others with Internet-
based tactics (e.g., generating comments, sharing propaganda on social media, hack-
ing secured digital infrastructures). 
 
3 Findings 
 
Conscription still exists in Russia (a mandatory 12-months draft), and beginning 2013 
its military started encouraging the civil universities’ best graduates to serve it in “re-
search companies”. One such company (the Sixth research company - “military 
cyber-defenders”, 60 people) is attached to the Shtemenko Military Institute located 
in the city of Krasnodar and conducting applied research related to information secu-
rity. After their 12-month mandatory term, the research companies’ conscripts are 
strongly encouraged to continue military service as officers on contract. 
 
In August 2015 one LiveJournal’s blogger (“otakvot”) posted research describing an 
interesting “anomaly” revealed by the Google Trends service. He found several Rus-
sian small towns with an abnormally high interest in the contentious political matters. 
Specifically, he found that, according to the Google Trends, such small Russian towns 
as Olgino (4,119 people), Perekatnyy (244 people), Zelyony Gorod (2,679 people) 
and the slightly larger Yablonovsky (30,518 people) have higher or comparable inter-
est in searching Google on such contentious political terms as “майдан” (symbol of 
Ukrainian pro-democracy revolution), “санкции” (sanctions), “референдум” (refer-
endum), “НАТО” (NATO) (after 2013), “Порошенко” (Poroshenko), as big Russian 
cities where millions of people live. At the same time, search on more common and 
less politically-charged Russian terms in the Google Trends predictably surfaces only 
the biggest Russian cities. We conducted our own search in the Google Trends on the 
term “майдан” and can confirm “otakvot”’s findings (Fig. 1): 
 
 
    
Fig. 1. Screenshot of our Google Trends search on the term “майдан”. 
 
For this project we investigated the particularly-high political interest in those four 
small Russian towns. In his blog research “otakvot” notes that Olgino hosts the infa-
mous Russian troll factory, where hundreds of paid trolls – trolls that can be con-
ceived as cybertroops – work around the clock. Our work aims to illuminate what 
may be happening in the other three small towns – Yablonovsky, Perekatnyy and 
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Zelyony Gorod. Finding the Shtemenko Institute on the map proved an informative 
early step, its address: ul. Krasina, 4, Krasnodar, Krasnodarskiy kray, Russia, 350035. 
With Google Maps we provide means for visualizing this location next in Fig. 2:  
 
   
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the Shtemenko Military Institute’ location on the Google Maps. 
 
On Fig. 2 we see that both Yablonovsky and Perekatnyy (“Perekatni”) are located 
within approximately a mile from the Shtemenko Institute. Google can, most likely, 
attribute the searches conducted at the Institute to those two locations. Moreover, if 
we look at the last “abnormal” town, Zelyony Gorod on Google Maps, we find it in 
close proximity to another Institute similar to Shtemenko, but this time belonging to 
the FSB: specifically, the Nizhniy Novgorod FSB Institute is likely causing the anom-
aly in politically-focused digital traffic. With Google Maps we provide means for 
visualizing this FSB Institute location next in Fig. 3: 
 
 
   
Fig. 3. Screenshot of the Nizhniy Novgorod FSB Institute’s location on the Google 
Maps. 
 
We thus assert that Russian cybertroops are not only the paid civilians located in Ol-
gino, but are also the full time military and FSB personnel scattered around these rural 
towns in the region. Of course, Russian information troops are also likely located near 
or inside those bigger Russian cities we mentioned above, so their Internet traffic is 
“hidden” by the population of those bigger cities. Beyond providing an understanding 
of the geographic region and its Internet traffic, our findings suggest the existence of 
embedded groups engaged in political influence and disruptions to political processes 
around the globe.  
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4 Conclusion 
 
With this research, we focus on Russia’s Internet traffic and how that traffic is situat-
ed regionally and geographically. We also contribute to an ongoing and scholarly 
conversation about contemporary hacking for political gain. With Russia as a case, we 
can explore tactics and choices that can inform the ways readers might view any 
country, any leaders, or any media-influence happening globally in today’s digital 
culture. Though we recognize attitude change has long been an effective military 
tactic, and while we know hacking and spying are not new strategies, we illuminate 
the nature of a current case of militarized information attacks, one that rests solely on 
digital/new media influences. Instead of leaflets, and rather than physical attacks with 
boots on the ground, that is, we raise the possibility that hacks into energy grids, in-
trusions into confidential email boxes, and various social media tactics (e.g., com-
menting, incisive propaganda sharing) are the new coordinated warfare strategy in 
this information age – and with this particular project, we suggest where these strate-
gies are being deployed.  
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